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This paper addresses the principles of hardship and specific performance as being unreasonably burdensome or expensive
both in terms of their definitions and legal consequences. This
paper argues that, in a situation of hardship, the debtor can
choose to invoke either the rules of section 6.2 (hardship) or the
defense to specific performance under Article 7.2.2-b of the
UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts
(“UNIDROIT Principles”). Yet, while in a situation where performance of the contract becomes “unreasonably burdensome or
expensive,” the debtor might only invoke the exception to specific
performance under Article 7.2.2(b) of the UNIDROIT Principles.
∗
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I. INTRODUCTION
Contingent upon the binding force of the contract, as stipulated in Article 1.3 of the UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts (“UNIDROIT Principles”), the creditor may generally request the remedy of specific performance
by the debtor whether the latter’s obligation is monetary or
non-monetary in nature. However, this implicitly requires that
certain important circumstances surrounding the conclusion of
the contract must remain unchanged. That is to say, if circumstances radically change, such change shall be taken into
consideration when performing the contractual obligations.
The UNIDROIT Principles address this question from different angles: Chapter six (Performance), section two ( Articles
6.2.1-6.2.3) regulates the hardship situation under which the
balance between the two contract parties becomes out of proportion due to drastic changes in the market; Chapter seven
(Non-Performance), section two (Articles 7.2.1-7.2.5) regulates
the right to require performance. In particular, Article 7.2.2(b)
deals with an exception to the creditor’s right to require specific
performance, namely where the performance by the debtor of
his obligation is “unreasonably burdensome or expensive.” In
addition, Article 7.1.7 of the UNIDROIT Principles deals with
force majeure, under which performance is rendered impossible.
This paper sets out to analyze the situation in which performance becomes significantly more difficult or burdensome,
but falls short of becoming impossible. Sections II and III of
this paper discuss the principles of hardship and performance
as being unreasonably burdensome or expensive, both in terms
of definition and legal consequences. Section IV will examine
whether a hardship situation and the exception to specific performance under Article 7.2.2(b) overlap, and if so, what choices
are available to the debtor. Section V contains concluding remarks.
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II. HARDSHIP: DEFINITION AND LEGAL CONSEQUENCES
A. Definition of Hardship
The UNIDROIT section on hardship begins with Article
6.2.1, stressing that pacta sunt servanda is an underlying principle of the UNIDROIT Principles. 1 Article 6.2.1 states, in
part, that “where the performance of a contract becomes more
onerous for one of the parties, that party is nevertheless bound
to perform its obligations.” Thus, the party cannot get out of
the contract simply because it becomes unprofitable to him. 2
Rather, the contractual obligation must be performed even
though a change in the market has caused it to become more
onerous for the debtor. 3

According to Article 6.2.2 of the UNIDROIT Principles, the party can have the contract adapted or terminated in case of hardship. 4 Article 6.2.2 defines the hardship event as one that "fundamentally alters the
equilibrium of the contract either because the cost of a
party's performance has increased or because the value of

1 Peter Schlechtriem, Termination and Adjustment of Contracts [Under
the UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts], 1 EUR.
J.L. REFORM 305, 314 (1999) available at http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/schlechtriem11.html; Dietrich Maskow, Hardship and Force Majeure, 40 AM. J. COMP. L. 657, 661 (1992); Joern Rimke, Force Majeure and
Hardship: Application in International Trade Practice with Specific Regard to
the CISG and the UNIDROIT Principles of International Contracts, in PACE
REVIEW OF THE CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF
GOODS (CISG) 193, 238 (2001), available at http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/rimke.html#*.
2 Ole Lando, The CISG and the UNIDROIT Principles in a Global Commercial Code, in MELANGES OFFERTS A MARCEL FONTAINE, 451, 465 (2003).
3 Ania Carlsen, Can the Hardship Provisions in the UNIDROIT Principles Be Applied When the CISG is the Governing Law? (Dec. 14, 1998) (unpublished essay, on file with the Pace Law School Institute of International
Commercial Law), available at http://www.jus.uio.no/pace/can_upicc_hardship_provisions_be_applied_when_cisg_is_governing_law.anja_carlsen/landsc
ape.pdf.
4 Alexei G. Doudko, Hardship in Contract: The Approach of the
UNIDROIT Principles and Legal Developments in Russia, UNIFORM L. REV.
483, 483 (2003) (“pacta sunt servanda… may be questioned when a substantial change of circumstances leads to unfair contractual disequilibrium.”).
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the performance a party receives has diminished." For
example, the cost of a party's performance may increase if
the price of raw materials or the cost of labor or transportation increases. 5 In 2001, the ICC International Court
of Arbitration decided that when, after a certain period of
time, the claimant considerably increased the price of the
raw material due to the more stringent conditions imposed upon the claimant by a governmental agency , the
good faith principle (also prevailing in international commercial law, e.g. the UNIDROIT Principles Articles 6.2.2
and 6.2.3) imposes upon the parties the duty to seek out
an adaptation of their agreement to the new circumstances which may have occurred after its execution in order to ensure that its performance does not cause the ruin
of one of the parties. 6 In 2009, the Court of Cassation in
Belgium concluded that if an unforeseen price rise causes
a serious imbalance and continued performance at the
contractual price would be harmful to the seller(i.e., if a
change in circumstances fundamentally disrupts the contractual equilibrium), the seller has the right to request
renegotiation of the contract. 7
The value of the performance a party receives is diminished when the purpose of the transaction is frustrated; 8 for
example, if machines are produced for a factory which has since
stopped its production 9 or if goods are bought for the purpose of
export and subsequently cannot be shipped due to an export
ban. 10. In a 1990 arbitral award, the Schiedsgericht Berlin –
Germany terminated a contract between an importer of the
former German Democratic Republic and an eastern European
exporter for the delivery of machinery; the machinery in ques-

5 E. McKendrick, Comment to Performance: Arts 6.2.1 - 6.2.3 – Hardship,
in COMMENTARY ON THE UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL
CONTRACTS (PICC), 711, 717 (2009).
6 Case No. 9994 of 2001, Arbitral Award (ICC Int’l Ct. Arb.), available at
http://www.unilex.info/case.cfm?pid=2&do=case&id=1062&step=FullText.
7 Scafom Int’l BV v. Tubes s.a.s., Case No. C.07.0289.N, available at
http://www.unilex.info/case.cfm?pid=2&do=case&id=1456&step=FullText.
8 Doudko, supra note 4, at 495.
9 Maskow, supra note 1, at 662.
10 McKendrick, supra note 5, at 718.
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tion lost all value when, following the reunification of Germany, Western markets were opened to the enterprises of the
former German Democratic Republic; in order to prove the
principle that a substantial change in the original contractual
equilibrium may justify the termination of the contract is increasingly accepted on an international level, the Schiedsgericht referred to the provisions on hardship contained in the
UNIDROIT Principles. 11
Obviously, the UNIDROIT Principles recognize hardship
as an exception to the general rule of pacta sunt servanda. 12
In a 1996 arbitral award, the ICC International Court of
Arbitration, Zürich, stressed that the exceptional nature of
hardship requires a fundamental alteration in the original contractual equilibrium. 13 In other words, the hardship exception
clearly requires that the debtor cannot be held to his promise
in spite of the possibility of performance; 14 otherwise, this
would lead to disruption of the balance between performance
and counter-performance. 15 In this regard, the reason of the al-

Case No. SG 126/90 of 1990, Arbitral Award, Unif. L. Rev. 2001-1, p.
216, available at http://www.unilex.info/case.cfm?pid=2&do=case&id=627&step=Abstract.
12 Maskow, supra note 1, at 661; Doudko, supra note 4, at 494; Denis Tallon, Hardship, in, TOWARDS A EUROPEAN CIVIL CODE, 499, 504 (2004).
13 Case No. 8486 of 1996, Arbitral Award, available at http://www.unilex.info/case.cfm?pid=2&do=case&id=630&step=FullText;Case No. 7365.FMS
of 1997, Arbitral Award (ICC Int’l Ct. Arb.), available at http://www.unilex.info/case.cfm?pid=2&do=case&id=653&step=Abstract.
14 Indeed, the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (Article
62) already defines hardship as follows:
A fundamental change of circumstances which has occurred with regard to those existing at the time of the conclusion of a treaty, and
which was not foreseen by the parties, may not be invoked as a ground
of terminating or withdrawing from the treaty unless: (a) the existence
of those circumstances constituted an essential basis of the consent of
the parties to be bound by the treaty; and (b) the effect of the change is
radically to transform the extent of obligations still to be performed under the treaty.
15 CHRISTOPH BRUNNER, FORCE MAJEURE AND HARDSHIP UNDER GENERAL
CONTRACT PRINCIPLES: EXEMPTION FOR NON-PERFORMANCE IN INTERNATIONAL
ARBITRATION 391 (2007).
11
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teration of the original contractual equilibrium does not matter, 16 whether it is a change in law, outbreak of war or revolution, earthquake, flooding, exceptional weather conditions,
breakdown of economic systems, etc.
In the Arbitral Award of ICC International Court of Arbitration numbered 9479, from February 1999, held that a subsequent evolution of the legislative context of a contract, in this
case, the adoption in 1989 of the European Directive on
Trademarks (89/104/EEC), does not constitute hardship when
it does not destroy the balance of the parties’ respective obligations. 17
In another case, 18 a United States oil company entered into
a contract with the government of a Newly Independent State
formerly belonging to the Soviet Union. The American company was to invest a large amount of money and construct a power station. In return, the company would be granted a longterm contract for the supply of electricity to customers in that
State at fixed prices that would be likely to generate a return
on the investment. The energy supply system in the State in
question was later fundamentally changed by law, which made
it impossible for the power station set up by the American
company to supply energy at profitable prices. The ad hoc Arbitral Tribunal concluded that Articles 1.4, 6.2.2 - 6.2.3 and
7.1.7 of the UNIDROIT Principles are applicable.
Although performance has become excessively harder, such
possibility of performance by the debtor generally distinguishes
the hardship situation from the force majeure situation, where,
pursuant to Article 7.1.7 of the UNIDROIT Principles, performance is usually impossible, 19at least temporarily. 20 In addiMcKendrick, supra note 5, at 718.
Case No. 9479 of 1999, 2001-03 UNIF. L. REV. 664 (ICC Int’l Ct. Arb.)
(2001), available at http://www.unilex.info/case.cfm?pid=2&do=case&id=680&step=FullText.
18 Arbitral Award, available at http://www.unilex.info/case.cfm?pid=2&do=case&id=757&step=Abstract.
19 Tallon, supra note 12, at 499-500; Sarah Howard Jenkins, Exemption
for Non Performance: UCC, CISG, UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES—A Comparative Assessment, 72 TUL. L. REV. 2015, 2027 (1998); Lando, supra note 2, at
466. However, there could be certain situations, particularly in cases of economic impossibility (i.e., a situation, “short of an absolute bar to perform, but
16
17
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tion, there can also be a hardship situation where the value of
what the debtor is to receive in exchange for his performance
has diminished, regardless of his ability to perform. 21.
Whether an alteration of the equilibrium of the contract is
fundamental or not in a given case “will of course depend on
the circumstances.” 22 In all events, fundamental alteration of
the contract entails that normal economic risks cannot be considered as hardship; 23 in contrast, exceptional changes in the
market that lie far beyond the normal economic development
can be. 24 The Official Comment on the UNIDROIT Principles,
the 1994 edition, adopted a general threshold test. It states:
“an alteration amounting to 50% or more of the cost or the val-

imposes what in some legal systems is conceptualized as a ‘limit of sacrifice’
beyond which the obligor cannot be reasonably expected to perform.” CISGAC Opinion No. 7, cmt. 38, available at: http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/CISG-AC-op7.html). At the same time, these may be considered as cases of
hardship and of force majeure. UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES, art. 6.2.2, cmt. 6, art.
7.1.1, cmt. 3 (2004), available at http://www.unidroit.org/english/principles/contracts/principles2004/integralversionprinciples2004-e.pdf;
Roesler,
Hannes, Hardship in German Codified Private Law – In Comparative Perspective to English, French and International Contract Law, 3-2007 EU. R. OF
PRIVATE L. 483-513, 493; Joseph M.Perillo, Force Majeure and Hardship Under the UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts, 5 TUL.
J. INT'L & COMP. L. 5-28, 21 (1997); Tom Southerington, Impossibility of Performance and Other Excuses in International Trade, B:55 FACULTY OF L.
UNIV. OF TURKU, n. 4.1 (2001), available at http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/southerington.html.
20 Roesler, supra note 19, at 485; Rimke, supra note 1, at 201.
21 Southerington, supra note 19, at n. 2.4.
22
UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES, art. 6.2.2, cmt. 1 (2004), available
at http://www.unidroit.org/english/principles/contracts/principles2004/integra
lversionprinciples2004-e.pdf; Joseph Lookofsky, Impediments and Hardship
in International Sales: Commentary on Catherine Kessedjian's Competing
Approaches to Force Majeure and Hardship, 25 INT’L REV. L. & ECON., 434,
440 (2005), available at http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/lookofsky17.html; McKendrick, supra note 5, at 719; Brunner, supra note 15, at
426; Rimke, supra note 1, at 239.
23 Maskow, supra note 1, at 662; Brunner, supra note 15, at 416; Carlsen,
supra note 3, at 3.
24 Doudko, supra note 4, at 494; Maskow, supra note 1, at 662; Catherine
Kessedjian, Competing Approaches to Force Majeure and Hardship, 25 INT’L
R. L. & ECON. 641(2005), pp. 641-670, 421, available at http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/kessedjian.html;Schlechtriem, supra note 1, at
314.
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ue of the performance is likely to amount to a ‘fundamental’ alteration.” 25 Due to criticism by some writers, the 2004
UNIDROIT Principles edition did not provide for this general
threshold test. 26 Nevertheless, if the changed circumstances result in less than fifty percent decrease in value of the performance to be received or less than fifty percent increase in the
cost of performance, then the fundamental alteration of the
equilibrium of the contract is not realized under Article 6.2.2. 27
This is already supported by the international arbitration practice, 28 according to which cost increases of thirteen point six
percent, thirty percent, forty-four percent, or twenty-five to fifty percent were not considered to be fundamental alterations of
the equilibrium of the contracts. 29 In contrast, if this percent
exceeds fifty, the fundamental alteration of the contract will
likely be achieved. 30 Arguably, this fifty percent threshold is
reasonable in international commercial contracts in which the
value is normally high so that any small currency fluctuation
could result in a huge loss. 31
In 2009, the Court of Cassation of Belgium decided a case
involving several contracts between a Dutch buyer and French
seller entered into several contracts with seller, a French company, for the delivery of steel tubes. 32 The unexpected rise in
UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES, art. 6.2.2, cmt. 2 (1994).
BRUNNER, supra note 15, at 428.
27 Maskow, supra note 1, at 662; Perillo, supra note 19, at 22; Jenkins,
supra note 19, at 2028; Doudko, supra note 4, at 495; Rimke, supra note 1, at
239.
28 Doudko, supra note 4, at 496.
29 Id. In the case Nouva Fucinati S.p.A v. Fondmetall Int’l A.B, though it
was not concerned with the UNIDROIT Principles, the Tribunale Civile di
Monza (Italy) decided, on January 14, 1993, that the price increase between
the time of the conclusion of the contract and the time fixed for delivering the
goods sold by approximately thirty percent did not amount to hardship; see
this decision at: http://www.unilex.info/case.cfm?pid=1&do=case&id=21&step=Abstract.
30 McKendrick, supra note 5, at 719; Carlsen supra note 3, at 3;
BRUNNER, supra note 15, at 432 (stating that the threshold shall be eighty to
one hundred percent decrease in the value received or a corresponding increase in the cost of performance).
31 Doudko, supra note 4, at 496.
32 Hof van Cassatie [Cass.][Court of Cassation], June 19, 2009, AR
C.07.0289, available at http://www.cass.be (Belg.).
25
26

ALTERATION
OF
THE
CONTRACTUAL
EQUILIBRIUM UNDER THE UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES
the price of the steel by seventy percent was considered a
change in circumstances that fundamentally disrupted the contractual equilibrium; thus, the debtor (the seller) had the right
to request renegotiation of the contract. 33
In addition to the basic definition of the hardship event 34
mentioned above, Article 6.2.2 stipulates further conditions
that the hardship event must satisfy. These are as follows:
a. The event must become known to the debtor after
the conclusion of the contract;
b. The event could not reasonably have been taken into consideration by the debtor at the time of the
conclusion of the contract;
c. The event is beyond the control of the debtor; and
d. The occurrence of the event was an unassumed risk
by the debtor.
With regards to the first condition, it is of no importance
whether the event occurred before or after the conclusion of the
contract; 35 rather, it suffices if the debtor knows such an event
after the conclusion of the contract. “If [the debtor] had known
of those events when entering into the contract, it would have
been able to take them into account at that time and may not
subsequently rely on hardship.” 36
As for the second condition, even if the event that fundamentally altered the equilibrium of the contract became known
33 Notably, the law applicable to this contract was CISG. Neither the contract itself includes a price adjustment clause, nor does CISG expressly settle
the question of hardship. Thus, the court after pointing out that in order for
gaps in CISG to be filled in a uniform manner, regard must be had to the
general principles governing the law of international commerce, which includes, among others, the UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial
Contracts.
34 Rimke, supra note 1, at 239(the definition of hardship has “the form of
a general description”).
35 Maskow, supra note 1, at 662; contra Carlsen, supra note 3, at 3; Case
No. 9029 of 1988, Arbitral Award (ICC Int'l Ct. Arb.), available at
http://www.unilex.info/case.cfm?pid=2&do=case&id=660&step=FullText
(stating that hardship may be invoked in such an event takes place after the
conclusion of the contract).
36 UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES, art. 6.2.2, cmt. 2 (2004), available at
http://www.unidroit.org/english/principles/contracts/principles2004/integralve
rsionprinciples2004-e.pdf
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to the debtor after the conclusion of the contract, it could reasonably have been into account by him at the time the contract
was concluded. For example, the following circumstances shall
be considered foreseeable: failure of a central bank to grant authorization to pay in foreign currency when foreign exchange
control regulations were in place at the time of contracting; 37
armed hostilities between countries with a history of antagonism; 38 and political or environmental instability in a certain
country at the time of conclusion. 39 Because such events were
foreseeable but the debtor did not take them into consideration
when concluding the contract, then the debtor should bear the
burden. 40 Also, if the contract contains a provision on the allocation of risks of certain event, this event is deemed to be clearly foreseen and thus, hardship rules of the UNIDROIT Principles may not be applied. 41 As for the third condition, the
UNIDROIT Principles clearly state that the hardship event
impeding performance must be external to the party invoking
it; the debtor may not rely on self-induced hardship. 42 That is
to say, the difficulties of performance by the debtor may not be
the result of its own act or negligence. 43
The hardship event is normally beyond the debtor’s control
when it is a natural event or act of God. Strikes by employees,
however, may raise some problems, 44 if the employees are employed by a third party, the strike will be considered to be
beyond the control of the aggrieved debtor. Yet, if they are
employed by the aggrieved party himself, then the strike will
most likely be within his control because he could have overcome the strike by satisfying the demands of his employees.
37 Frederick R. Fucci, Hardship and Changed Circumstances as Grounds
for Adjustment or Non-Performance of Contracts, 2006 A.B.A. SEC. INT'L L.
REP. at 17, available at http://www.abanet.org/intlaw/calendar/spring2006materials.html.
38 Id.
39 McKendrick, supra note 5, at 721.
40 Perillo, supra note 19, at 23.
41 Roesler, supra note 19, at 484; Maskow, supra note 1, at 663; McKendrick, supra note 5, at 713; BRUNNER, supra note 15, at 424.
42 Doudko, supra note 4, at 497.
43 Roesler, supra note 19, at 485.
44 McKendrick, supra note 5, at 721.
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As far as the fourth condition is concerned, there can be no
hardship if the debtor has assumed the risk of the change in
the circumstances; assumption of the risk by the debtor may be
explicit or implicit. 45 In this respect, the Official Comment on
Article 6.2.2 further states:
The word "assumption" makes it clear that the risks need not
have been taken over expressly, but that this may follow from the
very nature of the contract. A party who enters into a speculative
transaction is deemed to accept a certain degree of risk, even
though it may not have been fully aware of that risk at the time
it entered into the contract.

Thus, as contracts to sell shares of stock on the stock exchange 46 or insurance contracts 47 are aleatory in nature (i.e.
depending on chance or contingency), the debtor may not be relieved even if unexpected and unforeseeable events disrupted
the market. 48 Furthermore, in the context of a distributorship
agreement concerning specific quantities of goods to be delivered, for example, a vegetable grower typically takes on the
risk of crop destruction by rainstorms and flooding and cannot
therefore invoke hardship. 49
In another case 50 where the plaintiff, a Lithuanian company, entered into a contract with defendant, a Lithuanian individual, for the sale of its shares, the defendant, after having
Maskow, supra note 1, at 663. McKendrick, supra note 5, at 721.
Perillo, supra note 19, at 14.
47 James Gordley, Impossibility and Changed Unforeseen Circumstances,
52 AM. J. COMP. L. 513, 525 (2004), available at http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/gordley1.html.
48 BRUNNER, supra note 15, at 424-25; Doudko, supra note 4, at 500.
49
Certified Award (Arbitraje de Mexico, 2006), available at
http://www.unilex.info/case.cfm?pid=2&do=case&id=1149&step=Fulltext
(“While agreeing that the meteorological events in question had substantially increased the costs of Defendant’s performance, the Arbitral
Tribunal found that another essential requirement for the occurrence of
hardship as defined in Article 6.2.2 of the UNIDROIT Principles was
missing, i.e. that the risk of the event fundamentally altering the equilibrium of the contract was not assumed by the disadvantaged party...").
50 G.Brencius v. Ukio investicine grupe, (S.C. 2003) (Lithuania), available at http://www.unilex.info/case.cfm?pid=2&do=case&id=1183&step=FullText.
45
46
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made a down payment of twenty percent of the total price, refused to pay the balance. When the plaintiff sued the defendant
demanding the payment of the outstanding sum, the defendant
invoked hardship on the ground that the company had become
insolvent and, as a result, the value of the shares was considerably diminished. In its decision, the Supreme Court of Lithuania, ruled that defendant was not entitled to invoke the
doctrine of changed circumstances or hardship as the latter
does not apply to monetary obligations and furthermore, in the
case at hand the risk of fluctuations of the price of the shares
was deemed to be assumed by the defendant. In this respect
the court referred to Article 6.204 of the Lithuanian Civil Code
which in substance, according to the court, corresponds to Articles 6.2.1 to 6.2.3 of the UNIDROIT Principles.
Notably, if the first basic condition is met, meaning there
has been a change in the market that fundamentally altered
the equilibrium of the contract, then all four conditions are
met. 51 Once the event disturbs the original contractual equilibrium and becomes known to the debtor after the conclusion of
the contract, it is quite clear that the debtor could not reasonably have been able to take it into account, could not preclude or
overcome it, and could not assume the risk of its occurrence.
In all events, the debtor may not rely on hardship if he
has already performed his obligation; the hardship defense
may only be claimed in regards to performance yet to be rendered. 52 If the fundamental disequilibrium of the contract occurs at a time when performance has been only partially rendered, the hardship defense can only be invoked in regards to
the parts of the performance not yet rendered. 53
Kessedjian, supra note 24, at 421.
UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES, art. 6.2.2, cmt. 4, available at http://www.unidroit.org/english/principles/contracts/principles2004/integralversionprinciples
2004-e.pdf
(“By its very nature hardship can only become of relevance with respect
to performances still to be rendered: once a party has performed, it is no
longer entitled to invoke a substantial increase in the costs of its performance or a substantial decrease in the value of the performance it
receives as a consequence of a change in circumstances which occurs after such performance.”).
53 Id.
51
52
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B. Legal Consequences of Hardship
In a situation of hardship, Article 6.2.3 of the UNIDROIT
Principles mandate renegotiation between the parties to adapt
the contract to the new circumstances; the debtor is "entitled
to request renegotiations" of the contract. Article 6.2.3 itself
does not oblige the creditor to participate in the renegotiations. 54 Yet, such a duty results from two other principles set
forth in the UNIDROIT Principles: 55 good faith, Article 1.7, 56
which is indeed the underlying legal basis of the hardship exemption, 57, and cooperation, Article 5.1.3. 58 The principle of
party autonomy also supports the duty to renegotiate. It is better that the parties themselves agree upon the alternative contractual terms that deal with the consequences of the hardship
event. 59 The mere fact that either party may resort to court
drives the parties to agree on such terms. 60 In addition, since
the provisions of hardship is placed under section six regarding performance of the contract, it follows that the UNIDROIT
Principles aim at keeping the contract between the parties in54F

5F

56F

57F

58F

59F

60F

McKendrick, supra note 5, at 722.
Id.
56 Luke Nottage, Changing Contract Lenses: Unexpected Supervening
Events in English, New Zealand, U.S., Japanese, and International Sales
Law and Practice, 14 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 385, 406 (2007); Perillo, supra note 20, at 25; Schlechtriem, supra note 1, at 319.
57 Tallon, supra note 12, at 503; BRUNNER, supra note 15, at 480; Doudko,
supra note 4, at 490; Ministry of Defense and Support for the Armed Forces
of the Islamic Republic of Iran v Cubic Defense Systems, Inc., Case No.
7365/FMS of 1997 (ICC Int'l Ct. Arb.), available at http://www.unilex.info/case.cfm?pid=2&do=case&id=653&step=Fulltext; Case No. 9994 of 2001
(ICC Int'l Ct. Arb.), available at http://www.unilex.info/case.cfm?pid=2&do=case&id=1062&step=Abstract.
58 Southerington, supra note 19, at n.4.3; Doudko, supra note 4, at 502;
UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES, art. 6.2.3, cmt. 5 (2004), available at http://www.unidroit.org/english/principles/contracts/principles2004/integralversionprinciples
2004-e.pdf (“Although nothing is said in this Article to that effect, both the
request for renegotiations by the disadvantaged party and the conduct of both
parties during the renegotiation process are subject to the general principle of
good faith (Art. 1.7) and to the duty of cooperation (Art. 5.1.3).").
59 BRUNNER, supra note 15, at 480.
60 Tallon, supra note 12, at 504.
54
55
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tact as far as possible, even in the presence of a hardship
event. 61
The debtor must indicate the grounds on which his request for renegotiations is based. 62 He may not request renegotiations as a purely tactical maneuver. 63 He shall also request renegotiations without undue delay 64 after the time at
which the hardship event is claimed to have occurred, meaning
at the earliest possible opportunity 65 under the given circumstances. 66 Nevertheless, delayed request by the debtor does not
exclude his right to request renegotiations; 67 it may, however,
affect the finding as to whether hardship actually existed and,
if so, its consequences for the contract. 68
61 Ugo Draetta, Hardship and Force Majeure Clauses in International
Contracts, 3-4 INT'L BUS. L.J. 347, 349 (2002); Perrillo, supra note 19, at 15;
BRUNNER, supra note 15, at 400.
62 UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES, art. 6.2.3, cmt.3 (2004), available at
http://www.unidroit.org/english/principles/contracts/principles2004/integralve
rsionprinciples2004-e.pdf
("Para. (1) of this Article also imposes on the disadvantaged party a duty
to indicate the grounds on which the request for renegotiations is based
so as to permit the other party better to assess whether or not the request for renegotiations is justified. An incomplete request is to be considered as not being raised in time, unless the grounds of the alleged
hardship are so obvious that they need not be spelt out in the request.");
McKendrick, supra note 5, at 723, BRUNNER, supra note 15, at 486; Rimke,
supra note 1, at 239.
63 UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES, art. 6.2.3, cmt. 5 (2004), available at
http://www.unidroit.org/english/principles/contracts/principles2004/integralve
rsionprinciples2004-e.pdf; Doudko, supra note 4, at 502.
64 UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES, art. 6.2.3, cmt. 2 (2004), available at
http://www.unidroit.org/english/principles/contracts/principles2004/integralve
rsionprinciples2004-e.pdf
(“The request for renegotiations must be made as quickly as possible after the time at which hardship is alleged to have occurred (para. (1)).
The precise time for requesting renegotiations will depend upon the circumstances of the case: it may, for instance, be longer when the change
in circumstances takes place gradually.”);
Rimke, supra note 1, at 239.
65 McKendrick, supra note 5, at 722.
66 Bunner, supra note 15, at 486.
67 Rimke, supra note 1, at 239.
68 UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES, art. 6.2.3, cmt. 2 (2004), available at
http://www.unidroit.org/english/principles/contracts/principles2004/integralve
rsionprinciples2004-e.pdf.

ALTERATION
OF
THE
CONTRACTUAL
EQUILIBRIUM UNDER THE UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES
Once the debtor claims the existence of a hardship situation, the creditor cannot simply dismiss this claim. 69 If the
debtor’s claim for hardship has a legitimate basis, refusal to
renegotiate by the creditor can later be construed by the court
or arbitral tribunal to his disadvantage. 70 The debtor may not,
however, claim either damages or termination of the contract
due to the creditor’s refusal to renegotiate. 71 If the creditor
agrees to renegotiate, then he must negotiate in good faith; 72
furthermore, he may not break off negotiations in bad faith. 73
The parties are eventually allocated the responsibility to
resolve the disequilibrium of their contract. 74 In Lemire v.

69 BRUNNER, supra note 15, 485; UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES, art. 6.2.3, cmt. 5
(2004), available at http://www.unidroit.org/english/principles/contracts/principles2004/integralversionprinciples2004-e.pdf("both parties must conduct
the negotiation in a constructive manner, in particular by refraining from any
form of obstruction and by providing all the necessary information.").
70 BRUNNER, supra note 15, at 483; Fucci, supra note 38, at 30.
71 BRUNNER, supra note 15, at 481-82.
72 Lando, supra note 2, at 467.
73 The UNIDROIT Principles explicitly state:
(1) A party is free to negotiate and is not liable for failure to reach an
agreement.
(2) However, a party who negotiates or breaks off negotiations in bad
faith is liable for the losses caused to the other party.
(3) It is bad faith, in particular, for a party to enter into or continue negotiations when intending not to reach an agreement with the other party.
UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES, art. 2.1.15 (2004), available at http://www.unidroit.org/english/principles/contracts/principles2004/integralversionprinciples20
04-e.pdf.
74 Jenkins, supra note 19, at 2028.
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Ukraine, 75 the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (“ICSID”) endorsed the settlement agreed
upon by the parties after negotiation.
In addition, the hardship event does not automatically result in an exemption from non-performance. 76. Indeed, the
second paragraph of Article 6.2.3 of the UNIDROIT Principles
explicitly states that the request for renegotiation does not, in
itself, entitle the debtor to withhold performance. 77 This is also
supported by case law; an Arbitral Tribunal rejected a defendant’s argument that his liability for non-performance was excluded on the ground of hardship, stating that even if the
events were to be considered a case of hardship, the effect
would not be the exclusion of the defendant’s liability for its
non-performance, but only the right to ask for renegotiation of
the distributorship agreement with a view to adapting it to the
changed circumstances. 78
75 Lemire v. Ukraine, (U.S. v. Ukr.), ICSID ARB(AF)/98/1 (Mar. 20,
2000), available at: http://www.unilex.info/case.cfm?pid=2&do=case&id=962&step=Abstract.
In this case, a national of the United States and the Government of the
Ukraine entered into an investment agreement concerning the establishment
by the former of broadcasting stations in the Ukraine. The parties submitted
their dispute as to the proper performance of the agreement to the International Centre for the Settlement of Disputes (ICSID). After the commencement of the arbitral proceedings the parties entered into negotiations that
resulted in a settlement agreement between them, which contained provisions taken literally, with a few minor adaptations, from the UNDROIT Principles, particularly from Articles 6.2.1, 6.2.2, 6.2.3 dealing with hardship and
its consequences. Id.
76 Southerington, supra note 20, at n. 4.1.
77 UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES, art. 6.2.3, cmt. 4 (2004), available at
http://www.unidroit.org/english/principles/contracts/principles2004/integralve
rsionprinciples2004-e.pdf (“Para. (2) of this Article provides that the request
for renegotiations does not of itself entitle the disadvantaged party to withhold performance. The reason for this lies in the exceptional character of
hardship and in the risk of possible abuses of the remedy. Withholding performance may be justified only in extraordinary circumstances.”).
78 Arbitral Award of Centro de Arbitraje de México (CAM), Nov. 30,
2006, available at http://www.unilex.info/case.cfm?pid=2&do=case&id=1149&step=Abstract (the UNILEX database does not supply the party names or a
case identifier for this particular arbitration). However, the present writer
does not agree with the Arbitral Tribunal that the only remedy available to
the debtor in cases of hardship is “to ask for renegotiation of the … agreement with a view to adapting it to the changed circumstances.” Id. It is true
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Nevertheless, withholding may, follow from the severe impact of the hardship event. 79 Pursuant to the Official Comment
and Illustration number four
on Article 6.2.3 of the
UNIDROIT Principles, withholding of performance by the debtor may be justified in the following situation:
A enters into a contract with B for the construction of a plant.
The plant is to be built in country X, which adopts new safety
regulations after the conclusion of the contract. The new regulations require additional apparatus and thereby fundamentally alter the equilibrium of the contract making A’s performance substantially more onerous. A is entitled to request renegotiations
and may withhold performance in view of the time it needs to
implement the new safety regulations, but it may also withhold
the delivery of the additional apparatus, for as long as the corresponding price adaptation is not agreed.

It should be noted that the debtor, when requesting renegotiations, may either claim adaptation or termination of the
contract. 80 Nevertheless, there is no duty on the parties to necessarily achieve a settlement. 81 Therefore, if the parties cannot
agree on termination or adaptation of the contract within a
"reasonable" time, regardless of the cause of their failure to
reach such an agreement, 82 either party may resort to court. 83
that the debtor has, first of all, to request renegotiations. But, if the parties
do not agree to a settlement, either of them can resort to the court which in
turn might, inter alia, terminate the contract. Moreover, termination may be
requested from the early beginning by the debtor if the changed circumstances so require. That is to say, nothing in the Unidroit Principles precludes
the parties from agreeing on termination without resorting to the court.
79 McKendrick, supra note 5, at 723.
80 BRUNNER, supra note 15, at 508; Lando, supra note 2, at 467.
81 BRUNNER, supra note 15, at 485.
82 McKendrick, supra note 5, at 723.
83 UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES, art. 6.2.3, cmt. 6 (2004), available at
http://www.unidroit.org/english/principles/contracts/principles2004/integralve
rsionprinciples2004-e.pdf.
“If the parties fail to reach agreement on the adaptation of the contract
to the changed circumstances within a reasonable time, para. (3) of the
present Article authorises either party to resort to the court. Such a situation
may arise either because the non-disadvantaged party completely ignored the
request for renegotiations or because the renegotiations, although conducted
by both parties in good faith, did not achieve a positive outcome.
How long a party must wait before resorting to the court will depend on
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In any event, the debtor is not entitled to declare termination
of the contract of its own accord. 84 It is worth mentioning that
the debtor may not resort to court without having previously
made a request for renegotiations; 85 otherwise, the court should
suspend the proceedings for a reasonable period of time to enable the parties to renegotiate. 86 The term "court" should be understood to mean the dispute resolution mechanism agreed
upon by the parties to the contract, 87 whether it is a state court
or an arbitral tribunal. 88
According to Article 6.2.3 and the Official Comment thereon, the court,- if it finds a hardship situation, is authorized to
grant four possible options of relief: 89 (1) terminate the contract
at a specified date and on terms to be fixed; 90 (2) adapt the contract with a view to restoring its equilibrium; 91 (3) direct the
the complexity of the issues to be settled and the particular circumstances of
the case.” Id.
84 Case No. 10021 of 2000, (ICC Int’l. Ct. Arb.), available at
http://www.unilex.info/case.cfm?pid=2&do=case&id=832&step=FullText.
85 Lando, supra note at 2, 466; Case No. 10021 of 2000, (ICC Int’l. Ct.
Arb.), available at http://www.unilex.info/case.cfm?pid=2&do=case&id=832&step=FullText.
86 BRUNNER, supra note 15, at 489.
87 Kessedjian, supra note 24, at 422.
88 UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES, art. 1.7 (2004), available at http://www.unidroit.org/english/principles/contracts/principles2004/integralversionprinciples
2004-e.pdf (“In these Principles – ‘court’ includes an arbitral tribunal.”).
89 Jenkins, supra note 19, at 2029.
90 This relief is expressly provided in UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES, art. 6.2.3,
cmt. 7 (2004), available at http://www.unidroit.org/english/principles/contracts/principles2004/integralversionprinciples2004-e.pdf (“A first possibility
is for it to terminate the contract. However, since termination in this case
does not depend on a non-performance by one of the parties, its effects on the
performances already rendered might be different from those provided for by
the rules governing termination in general (Arts. 7.3.1. et seq.). Accordingly,
para. (4)(a) provides that termination shall take place ‘at a date and on terms
to be fixed’ by the court.”); Case No. 7365/FMS of 1997, (ICC Int’l. Ct. Arb.),
available at http://www.unilex.info/case.cfm?pid=2&do=case&id=653&step=FullText; 1999-4 UNIF. L. REV. 11014, 1014-15 (1999). 1015.
91 UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES, art. 6.2.3, cmt. 7 (2004), available at
http://www.unidroit.org/english/principles/contracts/principles2004/integralve
rsionprinciples2004-e.pdf (: (“Another possibility would be for a court to adapt
the contract with a view to restoring its equilibrium (para. (4)(b)). In so doing
the court will seek to make a fair distribution of the losses between the parties.”); McKendrick, supra note 5, at 724; Rimke, supra note 1, at 240; Case
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parties to resume negotiations to reach an agreement adapting
the contract; 92 or (4) confirm the terms of the contract as originally agreed. 93 All options stand on equal footing; 94 there is no
preference for any particular option. 95
The court may not terminate or adapt the contract on its
own. 96 Rather either party shall request such a relief before the
court. The court may declare termination ex nunc (for the future) or ex tunc (with a retroactive effect). 97 When terminating
the contract, the court may do so upon conditions it determines,
such as the payment of compensation. 98 When adapting the
contract, the court may increase or reduce the price or quantity, extend or alter the period of performance, or order compensation. 99 The court may not, in any event, impose a new conNo. 7365/FMS of 1997, (ICC Int’l. Ct. Arb.), available at http://www.unilex.info/case.cfm?pid=2&do=case&id=653&step=FullText; 1999-4 UNIF. L.
REV. 1014, 1015-15 (1999).
92 UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES, art. 6.2.3, cmt. 7 (2004), available at
http://www.unidroit.org/english/principles/contracts/principles2004/integralve
rsionprinciples2004-e.pdf; Rimke, supra note 1, at 240.;McKendrick, supra
note 5, at 724.
93 UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES, art. 6.2.3, cmt. 7 (2004), available at
http://www.unidroit.org/english/principles/contracts/principles2004/integralve
rsionprinciples2004-e.pdf (“Para. (4) of this Article expressly states that the
court may terminate or adapt the contract only when this is reasonable. The
circumstances may even be such that neither termination nor adaptation is
appropriate and in consequence the only reasonable solution will be for the
court either to direct the parties to resume negotiations with a view to reaching agreement on the adaptation of the contract, or to confirm the terms of
the contract as they stand.”); McKendrick, supra note 5, at 724.
94 But see Doudko, supra note 4, at 504 (“Though the Principles do not
expressly prefer the adaptation remedy it is nevertheless, regarded as the
backbone principle of its hardship provisions.”).
95 Roesler, supra note 19, at 505; BRUNNER, supra note 15, at 407, 409510.
96 BRUNNER, supra note 15, at 511; Doudko, supra note 4, at 504.
97 BRUNNER, supra note 15, at 511.
98 Id. at 512.
99 UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES, art. 6.2.3, cmt. 7 (2004), available at
http://www.unidroit.org/english/principles/contracts/principles2004/integralve
rsionprinciples2004-e.pdf (“This may or may not, depending on the nature of
the hardship, involve a price adaptation. However, if it does, the adaptation
will not necessarily reflect in full the loss entailed by the change in circumstances, since the court will, for instance, have to consider the extent to which
one of the parties has taken a risk and the extent to which the party entitled
to receive a performance may still benefit from that performance.”).
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tract upon the parties. 100 Taking into account that judges in
some countries are not allowed to adapt the contract, the guidance of paragraph four of Article 6.2.3 will be extremely difficult to follow by all courts around the world. 101 Furthermore,
judges are not always specialized or aware of economic relations and conditions. 102 Thus, the decision to adapt the contract may be more easily determined by an arbitral tribunal
than by a state court.
In addition, the court may order renegotiations as the only
possible solution when it becomes obvious that the court’s intervention to adapt or terminate is not reasonable. As for the
last option of relief, it would obviously lead to a situation in
which the debtor has to continue to carry the burden of hardship, which seems to be contrary to the rationale of hardship
under the UNIDROIT Principles. 103 Notably, the most current
case law available, shows that tribunals, do not refuse to revise
the contract by a declaration that the contract be performed as
originally agreed.
III. SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE IS UNREASONABLY BURDENSOME
OR EXPENSIVE: DEFINITION AND LEGAL CONSEQUENCES
A. When Specific Performance is Unreasonably Burdensome or
Expensive
Specific performance is dealt with differently among the
major legal systems in the world. 104 Whereas common law jurisdictions consider it as an exceptional remedy, most civil law
systems treat it as a primary remedy. 105
Thus, the
104F

105F

Doudko, supra note 4,at 505.
Kessedjian, supra note 24, at 422; BRUNNER, supra note 15, at 401.
102 Kessedjian, supra note 24, at 422.
103 Draetta, supra note 61, at 350.
104 Ingeborg Schwenzer, Specific Performance and Damages According to
the 1994 UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts, 1-3
EUR. J. L. REFORM 289-303, 290 (1999) available at: http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/schwenzer1.html.
105 UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES, art. 7.2.2, cmt. 1 . (2004), available at
http://www.unidroit.org/english/principles/contracts/principles2004/integralve
rsionprinciples2004-e.pdf (“[E]ach party should as a rule be entitled to re100
101

ALTERATION
OF
THE
CONTRACTUAL
EQUILIBRIUM UNDER THE UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES
UNIDROIT Principles has sought a compromise: the
UNIDROIT Principles establish on the one hand the right to
performance as a general rule,106 like civil law systems;107 on
the other hand, the UNIDROIT Principles also include numerous exceptions, which in turn resemble the more restrictive approach of common law systems.108
The UNIDROIT Principles make a clear distinction between specific performance of monetary and non-monetary obligations. With regard to monetary obligations, Article 7.2.1 of
the UNIDROIT Principles recognizes specific performance
completely, 109 without exceptions.110 The Official Comment
clearly states the right of the creditor to require repair or require performance by the other party …. While this is not controversial in civil law countries, common law systems allow enforcement of non-monetary obligations only in special circumstances.”); H.Schelhaas, Comment to NonPerformance in General, Arts. 7.1.1 - 7.1.7, in COMMENTARY ON THE UNIDROIT
PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS (PICC) 728-76, 783-84
(S. Vogenauer & J. Kleinheisterkamp eds., 2009).
106 Schwenzer, supra note 104, at 296; John Felemegas, The Right to Require Performance: Comparison between the provisions of the CISG (Arts. 28,
46, and 62) and Counterpart Provisions of the UNIDROIT Principles (Arts.
7.2.1 – 7.2.5), in AN INTERNATIONAL APPROACH TO THE INTERPRETATION OF THE
UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF
GOODS (1980) AS UNIFORM SALES LAW 143-63, 155 (John Felemegas ed., 2007).
107 Mahdi Zahraa & Aburima Ghith, Specific Performance in the Light of
the CISG, the Unidroit Principles and Libyan Law, 2002-3 REV. DR. UNIF.
751-74. 758 (2002).
108 Id. at 759-60; Schwenzer, supra note 104, at 292.
109 Lando, supra note 2, at 468. Notably, according to the Official Comment on Article 7.2.1, this rule is adopted in order to “reflect the generally
accepted principle that payment of money which is due under a contractual
obligation can always be demanded and, if the demand is not met, enforced
by legal action before a court.” UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES, art. 7.2.1, cmt. 1 .
(2004), available at http://www.unidroit.org/english/principles/contracts/principles2004/integralversionprinciples2004-e.pdf
110 UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES, art. 7.2.1, cmt. (2004), available at
http://www.unidroit.org/english/principles/contracts/principles2004/integralve
rsionprinciples2004-e.pdf
(“Where a party who is obliged to pay money does not do so, the other
party may require payment.”). In exceptional situations however, “the
right to require payment of the price of the goods or services to be delivered or rendered may be excluded. This is in particular the case where
a usage (Article 1.9 UP) requires a seller to resell goods which are neither accepted nor paid for by the buyer.”)
Id.
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placement of the payment of money by the debtor. For instance,
in the case of an insufficient payment, payment in the wrong
currency, or to an account different from that agreed upon by
the parties.111
Article 7.2.2 of the UNIDROIT Principles recognizes the
claim for specific performance of non-monetary obligations in
general; however, specific performance is excluded in several
special situations. 112 Admittedly, the right to specific performance is in accord with the principle of pacta sunt servenda,113 that is, the binding force of contractual obligations underlying the UNIDROIT Principles Article 1.3.114 In addition,
specific performance by the debtor gives the creditor to the
greatest extent possible what is due to him under the contract.
Article 7.2.3 of the UNIDROIT Principles applies the aforesaid general principles (Articles 7.2.1 and 7.2.2) to the defective performance. 115 Article 7.2.3 confirms that the right to
require specific performance in such a case includes the right of
the party who has received a defective performance to require
“repair, replacement, or other cure of defective performance;”
for example, the removal of the rights of third persons over
goods or the obtaining of a necessary public permission.
UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES, art. 7.2.3, cmt. 2 (2004), available at
http://www.unidroit.org/english/principles/contracts/principles2004/integralve
rsionprinciples2004-e.pdf; see also Schwenzer, supra note 104, at 293.
112 Contrary to CISG (Article 28), the Unidroit Principles do not treat the
right to require performance as a discretionary remedy that depends on domestic law and the rules of the forum; the court must grant the aggrieved
party specific performance of non-monetary obligations, unless one of the exceptions enumerated in Article 7.2.2 applies. UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES, art.
7.2.2, cmt. 2 (2004), available at http://www.unidroit.org/english/principles/contracts/principles2004/integralversionprinciples2004-e.pdf; Felemegas, supra note 106, at 155; Schwenzer, supra note 104, at 292; Lando, supra note 2,
at 469-90.
113 Schelhaas, supra note 105, at 784.
114 UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES, art. 7.2.2, cmt. 1 (2004), available at
http://www.unidroit.org/english/principles/contracts/principles2004/integralve
rsionprinciples2004-e.pdf (“In accordance with the general principle of the
binding character of the contract (see Art. 1.3), each party should as a rule be
entitled to require performance by the other party.”)
115 UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES, art. 7.2.3, cmt. 1 (2004), available at
http://www.unidroit.org/english/principles/contracts/principles2004/integralve
rsionprinciples2004-e.pdf.
111
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Among the exceptions to the specific performance of the
non-monetary obligation is the situation in which “performance
or, where relevant, enforcement is unreasonably burdensome
or expensive,” as stated in Article 7.2.2(b). Clearly, the general
principle of reasonableness underlying the UNIDROIT Principles is the basis of this exception.116 Exclusion of specific
performance in “this [situation] could also be seen as an extension of the operation of the principle of good faith.”117 With
regard to this exceptional situation, the Official Comment on
Article 7.2.2 of the UNIDROIT Principles further states: “particularly when there has been a drastic change of circumstances after the conclusion of a contract, performance, although
still possible, may have become so onerous that it would run
counter to the general principle of good faith and fair dealing
(Art. 1.7) to require it.”118
According to this exception, performance cannot, therefore,
be required if it would involve the debtor in unreasonable effort
or expense due to a drastic change of circumstances after the
contract conclusion. 119 The question is when is effort or expense unreasonable? One author suggests a comparative economic assessment: The economic costs and benefits of the performance shall be balanced against each other; that is to say,
the court shall weigh up both parties’ interests against the possibility of specific performance.120
First, considerations as to the reasonableness of the trans-

Felemegas, supra note 106, at 155.
Schelhaas, supra note 105, at 789; Zahraa & Ghith, supra note 107, at
760; Chengwei Liu, Specific Performance: Perspectives from the CISG,
UNIDROIT Principles, PECL and Case Law 29 (2005), available at
http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/chengwei3.html (quoting Jarno Vanto, Remarks on the Manner in which the Principles of European Contract Law
May be Used to Interpret or Supplement Article 46 of the CISG, PRINCIPLES OF
EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW, http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/text/peclcomp46.html.).
118 UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES, art. 7.2.2, cmt. 3 (2004), available at
http://www.unidroit.org/english/principles/contracts/principles2004/integralve
rsionprinciples2004-e.pdf.
119 Zahraa & Ghith, supra note 107, at 760.
120 Schelhaas, supra note 105, at 790.
116
117

24 PACE INT’L L. REV. ONLINE COMPANION [Vol. 2:5
2010]
action itself or of the appropriateness of the counterperformance are irrelevant in this context.121 Likewise, specific performance will not be excluded merely because damages
might be an adequate remedy.122 Also, specific performance
will normally be granted in cases in which the subject matter of
the contract is something unique and/or irreplaceable in nature; that is, something not easily available elsewhere.123
In contrast, specific performance will not be ordered if the
performance would be quite different to the original obligation;
for example, a lessee who has carelessly burned down the
leased premises will not be ordered to re-build them. 124 In
many cases involving small, insignificant defects, both replacement and repair may involve unreasonable effort or expense and are therefore excluded. In addition, the wording
"where relevant, enforcement," contained in Article 7.2.2(b) of
the UNIDROIT Principles, takes into account the following
fact:
[I]n common law systems it is the courts and not the [creditors]
who supervise the execution of orders for specific performance. As
a consequence, in certain cases, especially those involving performances extended in time, courts in those countries refuse specific performance if supervision would impose undue burdens
upon courts. 125

B. Legal Consequences of Specific Performance Being
Unreasonably Burdensome or Expensive
One of the consequences that arise from the exception
stated in Article 7.2.2(b) of the UNIDROIT Principles is clearly
the exclusion of specific performance of the obligation. Unlike
the case of hardship where the contract is terminated and con-

Id.
Id.
123 Id. at 790-91; Zahraa & Ghith, supra note 107, at 769.
124 Liu, supra note 117, at 29.
125 UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES, art. 7.2.2, cmt. 3 (2004), available at
http://www.unidroit.org/english/principles/contracts/principles2004/integralve
rsionprinciples2004-e.pdf; see also Schelhaas, supra note 105, at 792;
Schwenzer, supra note 104, at 297.
121
122

ALTERATION
OF
THE
CONTRACTUAL
EQUILIBRIUM UNDER THE UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES
sequently the obligation as a whole, including eventual damages, comes to an end, 126 Article 7.2.2(b) only brings the enforced
performance of the obligation to an end. This means, in such
an exceptional situation, other remedies, especially damages, 127
are more adequate remedies for the creditor 128 unless the debtor proves the existence of an impediment according to Article
7.1.7. 129 In appropriate cases, however, the debtor may also
request termination of the contract. 130
If this exception only applies to a part of performance, for
example, the delivery of part of the goods sold is unreasonably
burdensome or expensive, then specific performance of this
part only is excluded. Thus, the rest of the contract must be
performed unless the obligation itself is indivisible.
IV. CHOICE BY THE DEBTOR BETWEEN HARDSHIP RULES AND
EXCEPTION OF SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE
Hardship normally applies to duration contracts, for example, “where the performance of at least one party extends
over a certain period of time.” 131 The nature of the obligation
arising from the contract is irrelevant, whether it is to deliver
something or to do or abstain from doing something. By contrast, specific performance is particularly important “to contractual obligations to do something or to abstain from doing
something.” 132 It can also be required by the creditor, regardless of whether the contract at issue is long-term or not. Moreover, hardship applies to both monetary and non-monetary obligations, while specific performance can only be excluded
under Article 7.2.2(b) of the UNIDROIT Principles with regard
13F

132F

Schwenzer, supra note 104, at 296.
Schelhaas, supra note 105, at 787; Lando, supra note 2, at 471.
128 Southerington, supra note 19, at n. 4.1.
129 Id.; Carlsen, supra note 3, at 13.
130 Liu, supra note 117, at 29.
131 UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES, art. 6.2.2, cmt. 5 (2004), available at
http://www.unidroit.org/english/principles/contracts/principles2004/integralve
rsionprinciples2004-e.pdf.
132 UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES, art. 7.2.2, cmt. 1 (2004), available at
http://www.unidroit.org/english/principles/contracts/principles2004/integralve
rsionprinciples2004-e.pdf.
126
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to the non-monetary obligations.
The parties are usually expected to have taken into consideration events that might affect the equilibrium of their contract. 133 Therefore, under Article 6.2.1 of the UNIDROIT Principles, “[w]here the performance of a contract becomes more
onerous for one of the parties, that party is nevertheless bound
to perform its obligations subject to the following provisions on
hardship.”
Under Article 6.2.2, there is a hardship situation where
the balance between the two parties of the contract has been
disrupted due to drastic changes in the market after conclusion
that fundamentally altered the equilibrium of the contract.
Article 7.2.2(b) of the UNIDROIT Principles entails that
performance cannot be required if changes in the circumstances after the conclusion of the contract make it unreasonably onerous or expensive to enforce the contract. Therefore,
this exception is not limited to the kind of supervening event
cases covered by the "hardship." 134 Indeed, the extent of alteration of the contractual equilibrium shall not be so fundamental like the hardship situation. 135 Whether all conditions that
the hardship event has to satisfy under Article 6.2.2 are met is
not considered when invoking the defense of specific performance under Article 7.2.2(b). For example, specific performance should be excluded in cases in which such performance
becomes unreasonably onerous or expensive due to an event
that was not beyond the control of the debtor. 136
Moreover, as the Official Comment on Article 7.2.2 of the
UNIDROIT Principles makes a cross-reference to the hardship
provisions in Articles 6.2.1 – 6.2.3, 137 hardship can obviously be
Kessedjian, supra note 24, at 416.
For a different opinion, see Carlsen, supra note 3, at 8 (“the requirements for applying Article 7.2.2(b) are the same as the requirements under
Article 6.2.”).
135 Schwenzer, supra note 104, at 296, (“the requirements for the exclusion of the right to performance should not be as high as those for hardship.”).
136 Id.
137 UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES, art. 7.2.2, cmt. 3-b (2004), available at
http://www.unidroit.org/english/principles/contracts/principles2004/integralve
rsionprinciples2004-e.pdf (“As to other possible consequences arising from
drastic changes of circumstances amounting to a case of hardship, see Arts.
133
134
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applied as a defense against specific performance. 138 Since the
hardship provisions are placed under section 6 of the
UNIDROIT Principles regarding performance of the contract, it
follows that it was intended as a defense against specific performance. 139
It is worth mentioning that the cross-reference to hardship
is made by the Official Comment on Article 7.2.2 that deals
with performance of non-monetary obligation. With regards to
performance of monetary obligations, by contrast, there is no
cross-reference to hardship in the Official Comment on Article
7.2.1. However, the Official Comment on Article 6.2.2 (definition of hardship) states,"[t]he performance may be that either
of a monetary or a non-monetary obligation." Thus, the hardship defense would apply as a defense against specific performance of both monetary and non-monetary obligations. 140
By contrast, where performance of the contract becomes
“unreasonably burdensome or expensive,” the debtor might only invoke the exception to specific performance under Article
7.2.2(b). As the alteration of the contractual equilibrium is not
so fundamental, and consequently there is no hardship situation, the debtor cannot invoke the rules of section 6.2 (hardship) of the UNIDROIT Principles. This is emphasized by the
fact that the Official Comment on Article 6.2.2 of the
UNIDROIT Principles does not make any cross-reference to the
specific performance exception in Article 7.2.2. Rather, the
cross-reference was made to Article 7.1.7 on force majeure. 141
6.2.1 et seq.”).
138 Schelhaas, supra note 105, at 791; Zahraa & Ghith, supra note 107, at
760, n. 69.
139 Carlsen, supra note 3, at 8.
140 Id.
141 In this respect, it is further noted in the Official Comment that In
view of the respective definitions of hardship and force majeure (see Art.
7.1.7) under these Principles there may be factual situations which can at the
same time be considered as cases of hardship and of force majeure. If this is
the case, it is for the party affected by these events to decide which remedy to
pursue. If it invokes force majeure, it is with a view to its non-performance
being excused. If, on the other hand, a party invokes hardship, this is in the
first instance for the purpose of renegotiating the terms of the contract so as
to allow the contract to be kept alive although on revised terms. UNIDROIT
PRINCIPLES, art. 6.2.2, cmt. 6 (2004), available at http://www.unidroit.org/eng-
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If hardship and performance being unreasonably burdensome or expensive overlap, it must be decided which one has
priority over the other in application. According to an opinion,
hardship calls for more specific rules that prevail over the exception stipulated in Article 7.2.2(b). 142 It is argued, however,
that the debtor shall choose which doctrine he wants to rely on,
the hardship doctrine or the doctrine relating to performance
as unreasonably burdensome or expensive 143. This is made
clear by the cross-reference by the Official Comment on Article
7.2.2 of the UNIDROIT Principles to the hardship provisions in
Article 6.2.
V. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, it is worth emphasizing the hardship event
fundamentally alters the original contractual equilibrium; it
must also satisfy certain conditions, mentioned in Article 6.2.2
of the UNIDROIT Principles. Once there is a hardship situation, the contract can be adapted or terminated by the parties
or the court. The court may also direct the parties to resume
negotiations to reach an agreement adapting the contract or
confirm the terms of the contract as originally agreed. In contrast, if performance of the obligation by the debtor is unreasonably burdensome or expensive, specific performance may
not be claimed by the creditor or granted to him. Instead, the
creditor may claim damages. Here, the conditions of Article
6.2.2 of the UNIDROIT Principles must not be satisfied.
Therefore, it is obvious that, in a situation of hardship, the
debtor can choose to invoke either the rules of section 6.2
(hardship) or the defense to specific performance under Article
7.2.2(b) of the UNIDROIT Principles. In contrast, where performance of the contract becomes “unreasonably burdensome or
expensive,” the debtor might only invoke the exception to specific performance under Article 7.2.2(b) of the UNIDROIT Principles.
lish/principles/contracts/principles2004/integralversionprinciples2004-e.pdf.
142 Liu, supra note 117, at 30.
143 Schelhaas, supra note 105, at 792.

